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Our own reality - however fine and 
attractive the reality of others may 
be •- can only be transformed by 
detailed knowledge of it, by our own 
efforts by our own sacrifices.
- Amilcar Cabral
By Reginald Herbold Green1
CONSOLIDATION AND ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT
OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE: What Agendas For Action?
...Fragments of our lost kingdom...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a deadman's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
T. S. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men'
We asked for bread
And they chucked a stone at us.
Senior African economic analyst 
on AD
Economic growth implies using... scarce resources more
efficiently....policy making inevitable has to embody wider 
political constraints and objectives...the record of poor
growth... suggests that inadequate attention has been given to 
policies to increase the efficiency of resource use and that 
action to correct this situation is urgently called for.
A D , p.24
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People...must be able to control their own activities within the 
framework of their communities. At present the best intentioned 
governments - my own included - too readily move from a 
conviction of the need for rural development into acting as if 
the people had no ideas of their own. This is quite 
wrong... people do know what their basic needs are...if they have 
sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to determine their own 
priorities for development.
- President J. K. Nyerere
What Common Ground?
^  2 •The Accelerated Development Report's agricultural vision,
analysis and prescriptions are subject to wide disagreement.
The Bank seems to have resiled from them by reinterpretation in
respect to whether: AD is a complete programme (or is necessary
but not sufficient), self sufficiency in food should have high
priority (now unambiguous yes), primary export growth led
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recovery is a general solution (growing gloom) and resource 
efficient import substitution is as good as export promotion (now 
yes) .
However, AD is a serious document relating to a serious problem 
or set of problems. Therefore it is useful first to review the 
main points of the Report which are fairly clearly valid with 
notes as to the limitations of the common ground.
First, there is a crisis in growth of agricultural production in
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and a majority of its countries.
The Annex data and tables (pages 46-50) demonstrate this and (by 
gross discrepancies of 'data' on the same country) how bad the 
data are and - as AD fails to note - that there are wide 
divergences from country to country. AD's treatment of 1970-79 
as a whole is somewhat obscurantist. Absolutely, relative to 
their own 1960's record and relative to Third World averages, 
growth of GDP in Africa was very poor over 1970-73, disastrously 
bad over 1974-75 and better than in any previous four year period 
(6% average real GDP growth or over 3% per capita) over 1976-79. 
The same intradecadal diversity seems to apply in respect to food 
production but not in respect to industrial and export crop 
production. Certainly, however, on average the 1979-83 record 
both for food and export crop production has been one of near 
stagnation and of per capita decline.
Second, a ’ substantial part of the problem relates to external 
factors (a point even truer over 1979-83) . The Bank cites 
(Chapter 3, pages 48-9) wars and civil strife, droughts and poor 
distribution of rainfall, extension of cultivation into marginal 
and drought prone areas. Most observers would add external 
terms of trade which, when passed on to producers, create an 
incentive to shift to other crops. Whilq^ the Bank sees the terms 
of trade evolution as positive to 1978 , this does not square 
with what national data exist. The unfortunate historically 
export crop concentration in products with low price and income 
elasticities of demand is a related factor.
Third, increase in total agricultural output - s.ay to 3.5% food
and 4% industrial export crops or 3.8% overall - i_s crucial. 
Who is to produce is less agreed - the Bank reverts to the late 
colonial "progressive farmer" emphasis _ (i.e. better off 
small-holders in high productivity zones) and totally drops 
distribution (and therefore actual hunger of real people) off the 
Agenda.
Fourth, incentives - price (including exchange rates which are 
foreign exchange prices) and non-price - are crucial. In AD's 
agricultural chapter - perhaps because they are easier to 
discuss in general terms - agricultural prices are stressed with 
much less attention to accessibility of purchasers, promptness of 
payment, availability of "incentive goods" and ndne to basic 
services. The- resultant approach is so narrowly sectoral and 
economistic as to be arguably counterproductive.
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Fifth, peasant participation in decision-taking and policy design 
is cited as a key goal usually in the context of privatisation. 
There is little evidence of, or orientation toward, surveying or 
learning from peasant opinion. The apparent vehicle for 
participation is . the free market, mediated by Platonic guardians. 
In this AD is in tradition of international African governmental 
and most academic analyses and proposals.
S ixth, a range of significant and remediable public policy 
inefficiencies exist. Some are inconsistencies within
strategies, e.g. pricing on the basis of ecological zone 
suitability without reference to location. Others are uses of 
scarce resources beyond the levels necessary to carry out 
intended purposes, e.g. marketing, or in ways unlikely to produce 
results , e.g. research and extension. If priorities diverge 
then "inefficiency" may depend on the viewer's perception of the 
targets sought, e.g. uniform farm gate pricing has a positive
distributional and marketed output effect, an uncertain effect on 
total cost of any given quantity fob market and a negative effect 
on transport and (usually) foreign exchange cost per
tonne.
Seventh, more data are needed. The existing data are so^yeak one 
neither knows where one is nor where one is going. This
results in use of those data which seem least unreliable to 
particular analysts - a process tending to confirm initial
premises and/or normative preferences. Without better data it 
is hard to set priorities and almost impossible to monitor 
performance.
Eighth, more knowledge is needed. Packages of technical know­
ledge/field tests/physical inputs/extension adequate to raise 
real output per worker rarely exist with delivery systems oft^n 
equally as weak. This has been stressed by the Bank 4 ,
Montague Yudelman (its chief agricultural advisor on Africa) and 
M. Lipton as the main barrier to restored agricultural growth. 
In respect both to data collection and interpretation capacity 
and to research 'development and application international and 
intraregional cooperation can be particularly valuable so that 
the very limited articulation of these topics in the Agenda is 
regrettable.
Ninth, it is critical to set clear priorities and concentrate 
resources on them (and therefore to exclude non-priority items). 
However, to the extent that AD has clear priorities (which is 
debatable), these are not necessarily correct for all countries. 
Granted that a single agenda for all countries with uniform 
priorities would not be. appropriate, AD could still present a 
more structured set of items likely to figure in some or many 
priority packages and of their interactions. It has a distinct 
tendency to list everything separately and without clear 
indications as to under what circumstances and in relation to 
what other measures any one policy -or programme would be a true
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priority.
And So To Implement?
The real, and wider apparent, breadth of common ground does not 
mean that one can move directly from AD to implementation. The 
Report's methodology is to take general premises, illustrate them 
by (positive and negative) examples and overall data tables 
(which do not correlate well with the hypotheses with the partial 
exception of WDR 8 3 's price distortion 'index' ), and then make 
sweeping prescriptions plus a long list of policy ideas. This is 
neither rigorous nor helpful in drawing up a priority list for 
any one country. Indeed President Clausen's 'Foreword' 
presents the Report as suggestions and insights from which to 
build and choose, but the overall tone is to use Agenda as a 
direct guide to uniform, immediate action with minatory warnings 
that "non performers" (i.e. performance on another Agenda) will 
receive less resources. There is substantial uncommon ground.
18a. The Report concentrates on upper income small-holders , 
suggests large schemes, large commercial farmers and large 
plantations may be needed too and praises Malawi which on 
policy grounds (steadily falling real smallholder prices, 
high de facto tax on peasant export crop |^les, heavy 
subsidies to plantations) hardly seems to fit;
b. there have not been uniform policies or responses to 
agricultural crises - which leads to some doubt as to the 
nature of causal impact of policies (indeed as to whether 
they really do have as deep and general an_impact on output 
as either proponents or opponents argue);
c. AD appears - the chapter has radical internal contra­
dictions - to argue for shifting from food to export crop 
production because- the terms of trade of the latter will 
move favourably over 1981-8S. With growing food deficits 
and the terms of trade moving negatively this appears to be 
a recipe for accelerated starvation;
d. some of the proposals seem impossible, e.g. raising real 
grower prices in a context of falling real national command 
over resources (physical output growth adjusted for terms
of trade swings) and/or implausible, e.g. maintaining 
domestic purchasing power for products when their global 
purchasing power declines (e.g. coffee 1976/77 - 1980/81
fell 75% in real global purchasing power);
e. others are based on highly contentious empirical claims or 
ones which seem dated (e.g. food prices since 1978 seem to 
have risen faster than the cost of living and a fort'iori 
than wages and salaries in most African countries; not an 
impression the reader of Agenda is likely to get);
f. the virtual dropping of consideration of distribution, 
basic services and women from the Agenda raises a number of
problems. It is unlikely to allow hunger to be overcome
even if output is raised; education - health - water are
^arguably key investments in labour force quality, strength
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and availability; with 50% of agricultural labour done by 
women and specialisation by task and crop, to treat women 
as "invisible" or in common with male peasants is otiose 
from the narrowest productionist viewpoint.
The problem that arises if one accepts these gaps, doubts, areas 
of criticism is twofold. First, one cannot proceed easily from 
this Agenda to action in any real country at any specific time. 
Second the strategy boils down to the 1930-1950 colonial mise en 
valeur policy (with slightly more public services, slightly 
higher levels of technology and slightly more emphasis on peasant 
and distinctly less on settler farmers) plus a doubling of real 
aid. That is not likely to work:
a. the stability (social and political) of many of the states 
would be threatened and - as Ghana, Zaire, Chad and Uganda 
demonstrate - disorder is not production efficient;
b. the lack of (cutback in) investment in health, pure water 
and education looks suspect even on productionist grounds;
c. the distinctly ■ sombre terms of trade and volume projections 
for Africa's main exports do not assume the sharp increase 
in African exports AD posits. As the total African share 
in most cases is above the price elasticity, if all African 
producing economies increase output rapidly then their 
total foreign earnings will decline, i.e. the World Bank 
has reverted to a fallacy of composi ti^ >|i evident two 
decades ago in its initial country studies;
d. the prospects of doubled real aid - which the Bank (in AD 
and especially in subsequent WDRs) sees as vital to make 
the policies proposed possible - seem to be nil. The Bank 
will be Jiardpressed to keep 6 structural adjustment and 6 
sectoral loan programmes going in Africa; if it had AD 
modelled SAP's for another 10 countries it could not fund 
them.
Picking the Agenda apart, even if necessary, is not sufficient if 
ones concerns are applied. The African food and export crises 
are real - even more real and general than in 1980/81 with the 
economies of Ivory Coast and Malawi (AD's stars) reeling under 
falling agricultural exports and in precarious external debt 
positions while a long arc of countries from the Sahel areas to 
the Horn and down to Lesotho have had devastatingly bad harvests 
in at least two of the past t,Uree years. UNICEF's 1983 State of 
the World's Children Report paints an appalling picture of 
nutrition and health service trends.
2 8That the Bank's attempts to correlate public expenditure , price 
distortion, official crop prices, etc. with agricultural or 
overall growth have rather low explanatory power and that a 
remarkable diversity of policies have had more similarity in 
unsuccess, raises more questions than it answers. Is the Bank 
too moderate - African governments and, a fortiori the Bank, paid 
far more attention to food policy and devoted far more resources 
toward food production in the 1970s (and especially from the
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mid-1970s) than in the 1960s but results are markedly worse! 
Perhaps both governments and the Bank should totally abandon both 
investment and policy? Or are events almost totally independent 
of policy, i.e. is there a gross overestimate of how strong the 
impact of agricultural policy is? It is odd to say low official 
grower prices lead to wholesale parallel marketing and reduce 
output or that crop movement restrictions are serious deterrents 
to food production and that the whole of a 400 ,000 tonne peasant 
paddy crop is parallel milled and marketed, much of it over 
several hundred miles. If low official prices lead to parallel 
markets and wholesale evasion of controls then, at least for food 
crops, it is unlikely they actually reduce production or bias
resource allocation significantly. Ineffectual and marginally 
wasteful, but hardly a key causal factor. For industrial and
export crops - with less opportunity for parallel markets or more 
for cross border smuggling - the negative production implications 
are likely to be greater while the allocation implications are a 
shift to food production. As the latter has historically been 
favoured relative to domestic food in terms of infrastructure,
service, credit and input provision that bias may in some
contexts offset the previous one, on balance reducing market 
imperfections.
What African states cannot do is to expect external windfalls to 
reverse the present situation. A negative result of the 
remarkable success many SSA states had in using temporary import 
cuts centred on consumption plus bridging finance to ride out 
1974-75 and then return to fairly rapid growth with relative 
internal and external balance in 1976-79 is that many have 
attempted to repeat that strategy from 1979 onward. These 
attempts haye, in the event, proven nearly uniformly disastrous 
even though the 1979-81 OECD-Bank-Fund projections of "strong 
upturn in eighteen months" made them ex ante appear perfectly 
sensible. The WDR 83 projections (on the middle case) for low 
income SSA are grim - domestic savings slightly over one half 
investment and under 9%, even with trebled nominal aid and 
borrowing flows an increase of GDP of 3.3% over 1985-95 (about 
2.75% over 1978-95) vs 3.1% for population or effective 
stagnation of real output per capita (and a decline for 1978-95).
What Is To Be Done: Some Building Blocks
AD, whatever its limitations, is a good starting list of problems 
and pressure points: price incentives, marketi'ng-transport- 
storage, research-extension-inputs, basic services, distribution, 
the role of external agencies.
Incentives are important. The debate lies on which are critical 
and cost effective. Even quite firm market mechanism advocates 
doubt that higher grower prices are the most critical component, 
AD correctly defines an "incentive structure" as "all those 
aspects of the farmer's environment which affect his willingness 
to produce and sell".
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Prices for domestic food are rising more than Cost of Living or 
Wages in most African countries. Export taxes and public (but 
not private) marketing enterprise profits are largely matters of 
historic memory (Uganda is a major exception). Price
incentives and urban/rural differentials are moving in the right 
direction. Food deficits and overvalued currencies have meant 
that relative prices have continued to shift in favour of food. 
Overall this is good market economics - the past patterns have 
been export crop biased and the real world price of most African 
agricultural exports has fallen sharply. At a broad level 
relative prices (which are more effective in changing crop makeup 
than overall agricultural prices are in raising or lowering total 
output) are moving rationally from market logic and for food self 
sufficiency. However, many particular crop relative prices to 
growers (whether publicly or privately marketed) remain 
distinctly odd.
Exchange rates are relevant in respect to intracrop price 
relativities. Overvalued rates normally give rise to a bias 
against export crops (unless the Treasury heavily subsidises 
purchasing bodies which creates another set of problems) and 
exacerbate the international terms of trade squeeze on producers. 
One of the stronger cases for exchange rate adjustment is to 
maintain freedom ' of manoeuvre in respect to relative grower 
prices (whether official or not) without increasing the strain on 
already weak budgets via massive producer (and/or consumer) 
subsidies or holding export/industrial crop prices so low in 
domestic curency terms as to cripple industry and export 
earnings.
What cannot be done is to raise real peasant income per unit in 
the context of declining national command over resources. One 
already has large overlaps of rural and urban poverty and in 
extreme cases peasant household consuming power above the minimum 
wage.
Other Incentives and Their Importance
Other price incentives may be more critical and lower cost;
a. access to buyers - i.e. availability of purchasers (public 
or private) at nearby places at frequent, known times;
b. prompt effective payment - i.e. cash on delivery or after a 
brief, known delay not in chits or after long delays;
c. availability of incentive goods, i.e. basic manufactured 
goods on which peasant household wish to expend the bulk of 
cash income whose absence renders any price "nominal".
Not often stressed as the primary problems, these incentives are 
noted as absent in case study after study, newspaper article 
after article, peasant complaint after complaint.
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A final incentive price issue concerns uniform farmgate prices 
and ecological suitability linked prices - the first a Bank 
ex-favourite now anathema to it and the latter a current 
enthusiasm. The former on A. Smith "vent for surplus" lines 
raises outlying area grower prices at the expense of the 
Ricardian rent of closer in ones. It often - e.g. Malawi, 
Tanzania - brings new areas within the market and raises output. 
It may raise or lower total grower price plus transport cost for 
any volume of marketed output, but raises transport cost. 
Ecological suitability prices are "overkill" in market terms. If 
a region really has conditions leading to above average output 
and below average cost for a crop a higher than average price is 
unlikely to be needed to get it grown there.
Marketing, Transport, Storage - Availability and Cost
Marketing is critical to increased, useable output as are
transport and storage. The greatest weakness is - non-avail­
ability of buyers either because of weak buying bodies (public or 
private) or because transport or storage gaps make buying futile.
Marketing weaknesses are case specific on the solution side but 
general from the peasant optic as high transport costs (real 
fuel, vehicle, spares cost increases, worsening of roads, 
oligopoly profits), overstaffed public procurement bodies, high 
private marketer surpluses, etc. all reduce the real farmgate 
price.
It is not clear that the grower's share of farmgate price is 
uniformly higher under private (or public) procurement. In 
Tanzania the. share of consumer price received by growers of
potatoes and bananas (two privately marketed staples) is lower 
than for wheat and maize (public). However, the private rice 
trade can (and does) outbid the public even when selling rice to
consumers at about the same price which suggests that it does pay
a higher share- of final,consumer price to producers.
What does seem fairly generally desirable - especially in respect 
to food - is the desireability of multiple channels and 
decentralisation pr^^ably including varied mixes of public, co-op 
and private buyers.
Transport problems are availability and cost. In many cases
reducing the latter requires rehabilitating railways, improving 
condition of roads, and restoring competition by building lorry 
fleets overall and ensuring that a substantial share are rurally 
owned (by individuals or village co-ops or rural oriented
enterprises). At present the risk of breakdown on poor rural
tracks combined with vehicle shortages for main road traffic lead 
to excess profits and to private hauliers simply not taking rural 
business. The latter can only be broken in the short run by 
rural based or public sector fleets. The endemic problem of the 
latter is that they get bad business and fail to organize
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backhaul traffic (e.g. a food company carries grain down and 
nothing b a c k u p  and a manufacturing company goods up and nothing 
back down).
Storage is critical. Buyers and transporters cannot buy or move 
crops if there is nowhere to put them. If food rots because of 
lack of storage it fills no stomachs. Articulated storage
system can even out peaks and allow orderly outflow of produce 
and inflow of inputs saving on total vehicles and empty backhauls 
and also reduce quite mad back and forth haulage of the same 
grain.
Storage does not feature prominently in the Agenda. With a range 
of 2% to 15-20% in annual grain losses in off farm storage there 
would seem to be major savings to be had. Losses before buying 
because of absence of village level storage and costs of cross 
hauls because grain is first moved to centralized stores are 
often high. If village level storage is adequate, vehicles 
needed at the seasonal peak are reduced while inputs can be 
produced and moved into the village stores on an annual cycle 
thus cutting out a chaotic pre-planting rush. The key is often 
ensuring that the primary (e.g. village) tier of godowns, pits or 
sheds receiving pride of place.
Inputs - Physical, Services,. Knowledge
Physical inputs (e.g. seed, fertilizer, implements), 
services(e.g . extension) and knowledge statistics and
research) are all in poor supply in Africa.
a. data on total output, yields per hectare, patterns of
cultivation, etc. are bad. Framing policy, let alone 
testing its results, is an exercise in hope and faith more 
than in analysis and empirical observation;
b. research is often yet to be done or, if done, has not been 
field tested in the microrecological conditions of the
. country, for .economic viability or under the conditions
facing peasant users;
c. extension, therefore, has very little to extend and much of
that l ^ t l e  peasant farmers would be very foolish to
accept;
d* inputs are unavailable or inappropriate partly because 
tested data needs is often missing (or wrong) and the 
articulation from research to production (e.g. seeds, 
improved hand and animal drawn implements) is often 
lacking.
Breaking this vicious circle will take time - the research and 
testing must probably start five years before major payoffs (a 
reason to start now and for donors, e.g. EEC, IDA, with long time 
horizons to give it priority). However progress on data, on 
improving extension to educate properly in what is known/tested 
(and nothing else), to learn from 'and generalize best existing
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peasant techniques, and to break bottlenecks in producing 
known/tested seed and implements (plus ferilizers, pesticides, 
etc. where these are cost efficient import substitutes) can and 
should produce at least some short term and substantial medium 
term results.
However, more - even along the priority lines indicated - is not 
enough. Resources now devoted to research and extension do not 
seem to be cost efficient, e.g. 50,000 extension personnel in 
Tanzania and research-extension-input subsidies of 5% of 
agricultural sector output are (with few exceptions) arguably the 
lowest cost/’oenefit public sector spending. The exact nature of 
the problems - in general and in any one case - need careful 
examination. Organisational restructuring is usually a device 
for evading the hard questions not solving the problems.
Basic Services: Knowledge, Strength, Time
The case for health - education - drinking water is fivefold:
a. they are basic human needs to which most peasant households 
give high priority;
b. their presence is an incentive to remain on the farm and 
their absence an incentive to urban migration;
c. education is needed to increase productivity including use 
of written materials in extension work and primary^^and 
technical education usually has a high rate of return;
d. health (preventative, simple curative, health - pre-natal - 
nutrition - sanitation education) is a prerequisite to 
working hard and effectively;
e. easy accessibility of potable water - quite apart from 
health considerations relating to waterborn diseases 
frees substantial amounts of women's and girls time with 
clear implications for peak season crop work labour 
availability, maternal and child health, f e m ^ e  school 
attendance, welfare of femal-e headed households.
To the extent AD is saying that without more production of goods 
basic service provision cannot be sustained, or extended, and 
that expansion of basic services requires increased imports and, 
therefore, increased exports it is making a valid point often 
overlooked. But to the extent it assumes that they are not 
incentives and production inputs, it has fallen into an 
economysticism so narrow as to be counter productive.
Dist r ibution: Is Trickle Up Ef f icie.nt? For What?
The A genda does not overtly discuss distribution - a telling 
shift from a decade of stress on "absolute poverty eradication" 
and "redistribution with growth". It is basically concerned only 
with short term production increases (which no one would deny are 
a priority), overlooking the fact that - especially in poor
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countries - who produces how determines who gets how much why. 
Participation in production is the only safe base for 
participation in distribution and'decision taking.
While the AD Report does not discuss distribution, its Agenda has 
an implicit philosophy about it. That outlook is not "trickle 
down" but "trickle up":
a. resources are to go to ecologically and infrastructurally 
favoured zones and to progressive (read richer) peasants;
b. basic services are to be de-emphasized - certainly not
pushed toward universal access;
c. remaining services are to be on a fee basis - limiting them 
to the favoured peasant sub-group;
d. real wages and informal sector incomes for those spending 
largely on food are to be reduced with the greatest impact 
on low wage/informal sector people;
e. the service cuts and selection principle for peasants to
back will intensify excess labour burdens and differential
lack of access for women as household heads, producers,
mothers, bearers of wood and water.
47This j_s "redistribution with growth" revisited - and reversed.
Whether this approach is consistent with development depends on 
ones definition. For the majority of the people of SSA over the 
short run (and in the not very long run the poor of Africa a^g
dead and Keynes’ dictum against ignoring short run costs
applies forcibly) clearly no. That poses problems as to whether 
the Agenda is consistent with medium and long term growth
enhancement. First, throwing away the bulk of Africa's plentiful 
resource, rural labour, may not be efficient. Second, lack of
access to basic services will worsen mental and physical capacity 
of many workers. Third, African states do not have the force to 
operate productionist police states.
Excluding peasants who are in ecologically unfavoured or low 
infrastructure zones and lowering poor urban real income levels
is hardly consistent with maximum growth in food production or
sales. Rural hunger in Africa is largely in poor peasant
households and can only, be met by making it possible for them to 
produce more.' Urban food demand (at prices encouraging 
production) will be compressed by cutting real incomes of the 
poor. A much more serious, complex and specific context
centred approach is needed to work out production/distributiuon 
policies to cut food imports, reduce incidence of ^gevere 
malnutrition and of hunger and build up markets for foods.
Concentration on larger, better off, best land peasants may not 
maximise production even in the short run. Kenya and Malawi 
evidence suggests that peasants are more scarce resource
efficient producers on average and for most crops than large 
farmers or plantations. It does not show that among peasants 
larger ones are more efficient - if anything au con t c a L r o : One
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exception is marginal/sub-marginal rainfall zones for which 
substantial resource allocation c^ rx. be justified only on the 
principle that human lives matter. Therefore, even on short
term production boosting grounds which AD's peasant focus 
upholds, its "neo-kulak" preference is empirically dubious. The 
same type of argument applies in respect to women, e.g. if there 
has been discriminatory lack of access for women farmers to 
inputs, advice, marketing, etc. then enhanced access should have 
high incremental production pay-off.
African Agriculture, Aid Agencies, Expertise and Outcomes
African agriculture has had more advice given - and taken - from 
outside than any other region's agriculture or any other sector 
in Africa. For example over 1975-80 in Tanzania virtually all 
price decisions, policy on research and extension, crop 
targeting, storage policy, supervision and overseeing of 
agricultural parastatals and more was delegated to an autonomous, 
basically expatriate staffed agency (the Marketing Development 
Bureau) which viqvred itself as responsible to its source of funds 
not to Tanzania. The citizen (and Tanzania hired expatriate)
policy and planning cadres of the Ministry were run down and 
demoralized, the interministerial technical committee on grower 
prices was abolished, the Treasury financial supervision of 
agricultural parastatals was blocked. This is perhaps an
especially dramatic case of - centraliz,ed, non-responsible, 
parallel administration (condemned by AD ), but not unique; 
large scale rural development projects have been c[e facto 
external financer controlled throughout Africa ever since the 
colonial conquest and independence has been marked by 
surprisingly high continuity and surprisingly little change. 
Several World Bank ex post rural development project evaluations 
identify almost total lack of local involvement in design or 
analysis as a normal characteristic and one usually associated 
with severe subsequent implementation and operation problems.
Several weaknesses have been endemic in these foreign finance - 
personnel - advice packages (many firmly criticized in AD ):
a. low emphasis on smallholder agriculture and food production 
(notably production to improve peasant nutrition);
b. inconsistent, rapidly changing price policy advice based on 
models and fashions more than analysis and incentives;
c. a rigidly bureaucratic, technocratic structure unable to 
communicate with, much less learn from, peasants and often 
marginalizing existing local expertise;
d. creation of multiple agency-linked projects fragmenting 
national approaches to the sector or specific crops;
e. failure to integrate marketing-transport storage into 
sector strategy and practice plus viewing health-education- 
water as optional extras not part of any integral agri­
cultural/rural development nexus;
f. creation of parallel agencies responsible (if to anybody)
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only to external suppliers of finance - personnel - advice, 
adept at building local power monopolies and fighting to 
avoid being integrated into, or accountable to, 
governmental or political processes;
g. a tendency to centralize all aspects of agriculture (to 
keep it in expert, technical hands) even when smaller, more 
decentralized units accountable to peasants within a clear 
policy frame looked better ex ante (and ex post) ;
h. a high proportion of bad advice (related to failure to 
build up and test local analytical and data bases versus 
"off the shelf" or "home base" guesstimates).
The MDB in Tanzania is an example. It achieved odder cross-price 
ratios than domestic price setting; dropped crop targeting; 
exercised 'oversight' over parastatals so generally they turned 
from overall profit to $ 100 million a year losses largely
without its knowing it - leading to continuing-^roblems of past 
losses, phasing out maize meal subsidies, and restoring 
internal and external control over parastatals; mishandled 
storage policy so that excess grain losses (rotted, deteriorated 
and sold as poultry feed, dumped abroad at prices often below 
farm to loading costs) were 600,000 tonnes over 1976-79; blocked 
decentralisation and double channeling of grain marketing for two 
years.
AD advice for "more of the same" is not convincing.
The Bank does learn by experience. The 1983 and 1984 follow-ups 
to AD (including the contribution to this symposium by Messrs 
Please and Amoaka), and the evolution of its structural 
adjustment programme thinking demonstrate this fact. However, 
while the shifts in emphasis and priorities and toward 
contextuality and diversity are marked they are somewhat unclear 
because they are regularly expressed as restatements of past 
positions even when they are - on closer examination - radical 
revisions or departures. Since AD the Bank has upgraded emphasis 
on food production, radically revised its views on what can be 
achieved by primary agricultural export expansion, come to see 
efficient export promotion and efficient import substitution as 
complementary not alternative. These are not minor changes and 
do represent a severe implicit critique of much of AD and of its 
proposals as at least partially erroneous. However, they are 
expressed as reaffirming what AD meant (a view one of its 
principal authors Elliot Berg finds as startling as does the 
present critic). Failure to admit error openly is
counterproductive. It hampers evaluation and learning and 
reduces credibility to recipients aware of how much of criticism 
directed at them flows from having accepted the critic's previous 
advice.
The point is not to blame aid agencies - there is little profit 
in pinning tales on donkeys (even if plenty of both exist
domestically and externally in respect to SSA agriculture!). But
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Africans have, on balance, been worse off from following external 
agricultural sector advice; they should approach new external 
prescriptions with much greater scepticism and selectivity. 
Unfortunately AD recommends precisely the reverse. In all 
candour, it is necessary to say that agriculture is the Bank's 
least successful sector in Africa. This might suggest that the 
Bank should adopt a much lower profile and defer to IFAD (which 
seems to have a better record and clearer priorities) as the lead 
agency in agriculture while building on its comparative advantage 
in other sectors.
Steps Toward Consolidation; Some Notes
The immediate requirement ’in a majority of SSA agricultural 
sectors is not development but consolidation, i.e. halting decay 
and disintegration. This has several implications:
a. unless they fill gaps or are essential to proceed after 
consolidation new projects are dispensable whereas 
maintenance and operation of core existing p r o a c t i v e  
capacity, infrastructure and services are essential;
b. both food and export/industrial crop production must be 
raised because there are both food and external account 
imbalances;
c. because massive additional resources are not available, 
prioretisation, reallocation and waste reduction are 
cr itical;
d. given the degree of imbalance and how badly price 
mechanisms function under such conditions, some "rationing" 
of resources will be needed to back up market management 
via pricing;
e. availability of buyers, transport, storage, - needs more 
attention relative to prices and probably offers the 
greatest potential for short run output increases;
f. restoring availability of incentive goods and inputs and 
government fiscal bases by recovery in manufacturing output 
is urgent;
g. programmes should be contextual, i.e. relative priorities 
and weights need to differ over time and space within one 
country let alone for SSA as a whole;
h. building better data_ and more careful, specific, less 
concealed ideological analysis are critical;
i. personnel and institutional capacity scarce resources (in 
both private and public sectors) should not be frittered 
away on low priority uses, whether fruit marketing boards 
or centralized rural household water billing.
More detailed elements relevant to many cases have been discussed 
in the thematic clusters above. A detailed "Consolidation Agenda 
for Agriculture in SSA" would exceed space available and be 
inconsistent with the contextuality and "learn from the actual 
local peasants" premises of this evaluation.
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From Consolidation To Renewed Development
Consolidation is necessary but inadequate. It requires
sacrifices which will only be accepted if they lead not only to a 
halt in decline but to clawing back past losses and ultimately 
to new gains.
Because it has a longer time frame and starts from a stable base, 
development offers more options than consolidation. The need for 
prioretisation and using resources efficiently in terms of moving 
toward them remains. Total additional resources per person for 
all uses will remain painfully small except in a handful of less 
unfavoured economies.
Probable entries on a priority list are of diverse character as 
some are goals and some necessary, broad means:
a. maintenance and expansion of earned import capacity per 
capita - in whatever exports have relatively low present 
scarce resource cost, relatively good volume and price 
prospects and potential for linkages (including fiscal, 
investible surplus and training);
b. acting on ECA's maxim "Unless sound and efficient 
import-substitution polices are implemented and exports 
diversified in terms both of products and markets, the 
projected )|j^torical growth of GDP might not 
materialize";
c. using price managed markets and operating enterprises as 
management tools with "rationing" limited to a few key 
items, e.g. foreign exchange, credit;
d. centering production strategies on absorbing personpower 
productively (including adjusting to its devg^oping quality 
as access to education and health increase);
e. achieving self sufficiency (unless hopelessly cost 
inefficient) in basic food;
f. achieving universal access to basic services including 
education, health, pure water, relevant production advice 
(e.g. agricultural extension);
g. building integrated (nationally or regionally) industrial 
sectors linked to agriculture as output users, suppliers of 
"incentive.goods" and providers of inputs;
h. more participation by peasants and other workers (in 
production, decision taking) for production and stability 
plus normative reasons;
i. building up a data, knowledge and analysis base and 
production capacity relevant to efficient deployment of 
resources to move toward the previous goals;
j. reducing dependence on, and being much more critical and 
selective in the use of, external personnel and knowledge - 
especially in respect to agriculture.
f t  ftThese priorities are broadly similar to the Lagos Plan of
Action and the Kenya Society tor International Development
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70xrOTTei ence. Whether uiiey are consistent with those of the
Agenda is a rather different question.
Post AD Bank thinking and practice in some respects seems to be 
evolving in parallel directions to those set out above. 
Unfortunately, IMF prescriptions and practice are not - which 
makes an IMF demand cutting one year standby quite unsuitable to 
achieving a 2 to 3 year supply stabilisation based consolidation 
or a 5 to 7 year structural adjustment to renewed development. 
This poses a paradox for the Bank because it requires agreement 
on a Fund programme as a precondition to a structural adjustment 
programme but increasingly sees actual Fund proposals - and the 
terms of their lending - as incompatible with medium term 
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breakeven' which a reading of summary sections of MDB reports 
did little to dispel. In fact a 50% subsidy was being 
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59. For a fuller - more critical - review of MDB and associated 
agricultural sector "aid" to Tanzania, see Payer, 1983.
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see "Synthesis and Synopsis" in Ndegwa et al, 1983.
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62. An open preference is not a problem; it is concealed 
ideological preferences masquerading as empirical truth that 
are harmful.
63. The long run may be frighteningly distant. If over 1978-83 
physical output has stagnated, population risen 15-17§%, and 
terms of trade losses risen to 15% of 1978 "national 
purchasing power" then as 1984 opens per capita command over 
real resources is 32|-35% below 1978. This is not atypical 
of many SSA economies. Assuming an average rate of output 
growth of 6% (vs World Bank 1983 projection of 3.3% on 
average), 3% population growth, no further worsening of the 
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64. ECA, 1983, para 116. The Bank 1983a now agrees despite A D 1s 
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micro level and somewhat more market oriented than that 
followed by South Korea or Taiwan or Brazil. The reason is 
not ideological but relates to the scarcity of competent 
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